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Over the past decade the global agri-food industry has come under increasing attack by 
advocacy groups related to their production and marketing processes (Bowmar and Gow, 2009).  
Advocacy groups have used these attacks to exploit the growing intergenerational disconnect 
between consumers and farming to campaign for narrowly defined political ideals while 
challenging traditional agricultural practices (Olin, 1999). This disconnect has provided 
advocacy groups the opportunity to use boycotts and other media attacks to severely adverse 
impact not only branded manufacturers and retailers, but their farmer suppliers. The agri-food 
industry’s challenge is to understand how to develop appropriate individual and collective 
responses to these attacks that minimize their current and future adverse impact and provide 
mutually beneficial outcomes for all of the channel members. Using an instrumental case study 
of the international cocoa and chocolate industry’s response to the child labour abuse and 
trafficking claims, we analyse and evaluate the alternative individual and collective responses 
that firms can implement to minimize their current and future adverse impact from advocacy 
attacks and provide mutually beneficial outcomes for all of the channel members. This paper 
follows a comparative institutional analysis methodology to analyse the multiple nested case 
studies and evaluate the impact and implications of each alternative.    3 
 
Effective Responses to Advocacy Attacks: The Case of the Global Cocoa 
Industry and Child Labour Abuse 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade the global agri-food industry has come under increasing attack by 
advocacy groups concerned about their production and marketing practices (Bowmar and Gow, 
2009).  Over the past few decades consumers have become increasingly disconnected with the 
farm.  Advocacy groups have seized upon this opportunity to increase consumers’ awareness of 
the welfare issues surrounding the agri-food products and to campaign for their political ideals 
related to these issues while challenging the associated traditional agricultural practices (Olin, 
1999). These attacks and boycotts have not only caused substantial adverse impact to the large 
branded manufacturers and retailers, but also to their farmer suppliers who must adapt or defend 
their traditional practices. The agri-food industry’s challenge is to understand how to develop 
appropriate collective and individual responses to these attacks while minimizing their current 
and future adverse impacts and providing mutually beneficial outcomes for all of the channel 
members.   
The international cocoa industry provides an instrumental case study for analysing how 
an agri-food industry has individually and collectively responded to advocacy attacks.  Following  
two substantial ecologically-based threats and collective responses to the cocoa supply, the 
international media published a series of targeted reports in 2001 that accused the global cocoa 
industry of participating in child labour and trafficking. The industry was faced with the 
challenge of creating suitable solutions to count these advocacy attacks.  These solutions needed 
to not only dissipate consumers concerns and create a more transparent and sustainable supply 
chain but also ensure that they maintained farm gate prices that incentivized responsible farming 
practices. Over the past decade the industry has endogenously and exogenously responded by 
creating a number of individual and collective solutions, some of which have been more 
successful than others. Within this paper, we use a historical comparative institutional analysis to 
evaluate different individual and collective responses implemented over the past decade. Initially, 
the industry member created a series of individual and regulatory solutions that drew upon 
previous systems.  Over time, the private sector discovered that these efforts could not effectively 
address their corporate and industry needs and thus they continued to face market criticism.  
This forced them to re-evaluate their objectives and create a collective system of institutions and 
incentives that provide a viable strategy for addressing the advocacy attacks.  The process of 
innovation and change provides important policy lessons about the necessary conditions required 
for the development and implementation of successful solutions.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section two discusses the methodology 
used. Section three introduces the industry structure.  Section four discusses the advocacy attack.  
Section five discusses collective and individual responses and section six analyzes and discusses 
the implications. 
 
2.  Methodology and Data 
This paper analyses the presented instrumental case study as a comparative institutional 
analysis using grounded theory (Aoki, 2001). Grounded theory is a qualitative methodology that 4 
 
allows for an inductive theory development process rather than a deductive theory testing 
process (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Dey, 1999).  Research indicates 
that this is the appropriate methodology for conducting exploratory, inductive logic research to 
analyse instrumental case studies such as this (Patton, 1987; Westgren and Zering, 1998; Yin, 
2003).  
Our research employs a series of nested case studies as a part of a comparative 
institutional analysis (CIA). CIA recognizes that there are a wide variety of institutional 
arrangements each of which provide specific and different advantages and disadvantages (Aoki, 
1996). This methodology allows for the collection of a broad range of historical, attitudinal and 
observational issues which will support our findings with evidence from a wide variety of sources 
assuring validity of our conclusions and supporting them with a broad understanding of 
significant underlying issues (Yin, 1989). This helps to better understand the diversity of 
institutional arrangements and draw connections between these in a way that creates valuable 
analysis of their similarities and differences (Aoki, 1996; Philliber, Schwab, & Sloss, 1980 ). 
Within CIA, a grounded theory methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 
1994) is employed to analyse the instrumental case described above.  This methodology is the 
appropriate methodology over alternatives for conducting this research as it allows for topics to 
be examined with a broad perspective in a natural and inclusive (Woodford, 2000).  This 
methodology proves especially successful when the research is taking place in a new topic area 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  This method of qualitative institutional analysis can analyse the issue 
without the use of elaborate mathematical apparatus or marginal calculations while identifying 
specific issues and problem for alter analytical and empirical research (Simon, 1978). The key 
criterion for such research is appropriate grounding of the evidence being evaluated (Eistehardt, 
1989).  This methodology is consistent with academic approaches to research on sustainability 
which suggest that a key component to such research is to address the current state of affairs in a 
way that develops knowledge to potentially benefit them (Dasgupta, 1995).  
Limitations of grounded theory include the limited scope and nature of case study and 
the potential for the distortion of crucial relationships between data points (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). Additionally it is important to include the perspectives of the parties studied in order to 
limit researcher bias (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). This must be balanced by the researcher who 
accepts responsibility for interpretation of the data collected and not regurgitation of the 
responses (Strauss and Corbin, 1994).  
The sources of data used for grounded theory methodology do not differ dramatically 
from other means of qualitative research and can be comprised of archival records, interviews 
and surveys. Data is synthesized, categorized, conceptualized, analysed and mapped into 
existing theory (Yin, 2003).  The data used for this study was comprised of public records 
including news sources, journal articles, newsletters, industry reports, publications and general 
web content. Such information was supported by interviews with key players in the spaces where 
necessary information was not available to gain a broader understanding of a topic.  
Archival searches were employed through academic databases to identify related sources 
in print materials such as newspapers, magazines, legal documents and journal articles. By using 
such programmes and databases as Business Source Complete, Euromonitor, LexisNexis, and 
Google Scholar sources could be drawn from a holistic coverage of available data related to the 
industry. Search terms used to accrue relevant data included “cocoa industry”, “advocacy 
attacks”, “chocolate industry”, “child labour”. Literature was included from a wide range of 5 
 
scholarly fields including economics, sociology, political science and agriculture. An explorative 
audit revealed a foundational understanding of the industry stakeholders and institutions to 
better ground our construct measure. Relevant concepts that had been previously outlined by the 
literature were father explored and those concepts excluded from available literature were 
developed and investigated further. 
Field notes and initial responses were noted as data was collected as part of an informal 
preliminary data analysis to understand basic relationships and patterns accounting for emergent 
themes and unanticipated case features (Eisenhardt, 1989). Upon sourcing initial raw data a first 
analysis took place, data was codified to organize, manage, interpret, and depict meaningful 
connections (De Wet & Erasmus, 2005). Observations were synthesized and categorized further 
in a process of reduction, re-ordering, re-contextualising and reconceptualising out data to more 
extensively examine and map the literature and gain an understanding of relationships and 
patterns between data points (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Coffee & Atkinson, 1996). These 
concepts were mapped out to create the theoretical framework of future research, and compared 
our findings with existing similar literature to build internal validity and raise its theoretical level, 
sharpen the construct definition and support the generalizability of our findings (De Wet & 
Erasmus, 2005).  As industry responses have continued, the process of writing this thesis 
followed a grounded theory research process involving an iterative process of continually 
returning to data collection to ensure its relevance and applicability at time of publication.  
3. Cocoa Industry Structure 
Cocoa is the product of tropical agroforesty, grown by an estimated five to six million 
largely smallholder farmers in the humid climates within 20 degrees of the equator (World 
Cocoa Foundation). Farmers grow, harvest and generally ferment and dry the beans which are 
purchased by local traders and exporters through a series of “middle-men” then exported to 
international traders and grinders.  The beans are then processed into cocoa powder, cocoa 
butter, cocoa cake and cocoa nibs and are then sent to (usually major multi-national) chocolate 
manufacturers who create branded products for the final consumer (Roberts, 2003, p. 165).   
---- insert Figure 1 here ---- 
The biggest issue facing the chocolate industry is and has been the security of supply as 
cocoa production faces many social, political, economic and ecological threats (Euromonitor 
International, 2010). In the 1990s, an invasive fungus ravaged the South American and 
Southeast Asian cocoa farms and the cocoa industry were forced to work on collective responses 
for this supply problem (ICCO). Disease destroyed more than 70% of Brazil’s cocoa crops 
turning the major chocolate exporter into an importer of cocoa products (Shapiro & Rosenquist). 
“No one had ever seen devastation like this before,” said John Lunde, Director of International 
Programs for Mars. Industry feared catastrophic results if it spread to Africa (TCC, 2010). 
Almost concurrently, cocoa supplies in Malaysia were destroyed by the Cocoa Pod Borer, a 
destructive insect, reinforcing the fragility of the cocoa supply.  
The global Chocolate market is estimated to reach 4.8 million metric tonnes by 2015 
(The San Francisco Chronicle, 2015). Organic and Fairtrade markets for chocolate are estimated 
to grow much more than conventional, especially in Europe (Monotti, 2008).  Recent complaints 
by industry players to LIFFE, which control the London market where at cocoa is traded, cite a 
lack of transparency and excessive speculation that are supposedly driving up prices. This follows 6 
 
several attempts in recent years to corner the market by hedge funds (Mason, 2011). General 
market trends include a move towards chocolates with higher cocoa content following a period 
in economic downturn where consumers desired cheaper chocolates that supplemented with 
different fats (than cocoa butter) (Euromonitor, 2010). 
--- insert Figure 1 and 2 here --- 
4. Advocacy Attacks against Child Labour in the Cocoa Industry 
 
Early History of the Chocolate Industry 
Cocoa was first dried, roasted and ground by the women of Meso-America who combined it 
with other seeds and spices to create a nourishing foamy drink with religious significance 
(McGee, 2004). The foamy beverage was brought to Europe in 1502 by Christopher Columbus 
and “drinking chocolate” was popular amongst royalty until processing, trade and production 
technology advances created a tablet product more like modern chocolate that made the product 
available to the general consumer (McGee, 2004).  This gave rise to small chocolate processing 
and manufacturers companies and in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s European and North 
American markets saw the creation of modern multinationals such as Cadbury, Hershey’s and 
Nestle. Even then the industry faced problems with advocacy and slave labour as Cadbury 
shifted its cocoa production from Sau Tome to the Gold Coast (now Ghana) due to ethical 
concerns of slave labour (Klinger	 ﾠ&	 ﾠAshworth,	 ﾠ2005). 
Witches Broom and Pod Borer Outbreaks 
In 1989, the already unstable cocoa supply was struck by an outbreak of the invasive 
fungus, Witches Broom (Tomich et al., 1996). Almost concurrently, cocoa supplies in Malaysia 
were destroyed by the Cocoa Pod Borer, a destructive insect (Shapiro and Rosenquist,2004). The 
amount of damage experienced in the major production regions of South East Asia and South 
America adversely affected production and emphisized to the industry the instability of supply 
(Habbar, 2007). This caused massive economic harm to the small scale producers in the affected 
production areas, such as Brazil where Witches Broom destroyed more than 70% of crops 
turning the major cocoa exporter into an importer of cocoa products (Shapiro & Rosenquist, 
2004). This dramatic decline in supply threatened the whole global cocoa industry (Habbar, 
2007).  Having never experienced devastation to this extent, the cocoa industry and producing 
country governments recognized the catastrophic potential of unmanaged pests and disease and 
the need for a cooperative effort to identify collaborative goals and increases the technical 
responses and capabilities in cacao-producing countries to protect supply (Shapiro & Rosenquist, 
2004; Habbar, 2007).  
As the cocoa industry rebuilt production, conservation groups, such as the Smithsonian 
Tropical Research Institute (STRI), determined that there was a direct inverse connection 
between their rainforest conservation activities and the cocoa industry’s re-development of 
income-producing practices within the forests (Shapiro and Rosenquist, 2004).  Recognizing this, 
STRI coordinated the First International Workshop on Sustainable Cocoa Growing (more 
commonly referred to as the Panama Conference) in 1998 where industry, academics, NGOs, 
advocacy groups and government discussed the conflicting supply stability objectives of the 
industry and conservation concerns of ecological advocacy groups.  The discussion resulted in 7 
 
the development of a set of mutually beneficial objectives that became known as the Panama 
Convention (Shapiro and Rosenquist, 2004).  
The Panama Convention Consensus Statement determined that cocoa had the potential 
of being a source of bio-diversification and presented industry best practice supporting the use of 
shade-grown production mechanisms, small scale farms and farmer support, constructive 
partnerships,  ecosystem preservation and integrated pest management systems (Smithsonian, 
2002). Although the Panama Convention was initiated by an ecology advocacy foundation, the 
resounding themes of the resulting initiatives determined by the conference were largely focused 
on the economic sustainability of the industry (Shapiro and Rosenquist, 2004).  Following the 
conference stakeholders collectively undertook implementation of a prioritized research agenda 
that included analyzing the socio-economic issues facing small farmers and ecological issues 
cocoa production (Smithsonian, 2002).  
 The results of these projects were presented the following year at an international 
meeting in Paris addressing aid effectiveness to a delegation of industry stakeholders which 
resulted in the Paris Declaration (Shapiro & Rosenquist, 2004). In the declaration, the chocolate 
industry, donor agencies, producer groups, trade organizations and major research institutions 
made a commitment to the sustainable production of cocoa (Schrage & Ewing, 2005).  From this 
evolved the Sustainable Tree Crops Programme which was aimed at using the market 
intellegence, industry knowledge, skills and experience of the private sector in conjunction with 
the undrstanding of producing countries, knowledge of development and networks of expertise of 
the public sector to address the needs of growes of agro-forestry crops (Verlande & Tomich, 
2006).   
Later that year, at a meeting convened by the World Bank, a group of industry, 
government, and NGO representatives connected at a workshop on public/private partnerships 
in Africa. Until this time, Cocoa was what the industry had referred to as an “orphan crop”  and 
had not received the same private and public support as “staple commodities” such as corn and 
soybeans (Shapiro & Rosenquist, 2004). Here, the chocolate industry explained the socio-
economic issues that plagues cocoa producers and was a major source of their supply issues to 
the NGOs and donor community.   Supported by World Bank research showcasing the 
importance of the agricultural sector to the world economy, donor organizations were receptive 
to industry and producer-government appeals for support for smallholder cocoa farmers (Shapiro 
and Rosenquist, 2004).  Subsequent discussions led to the formation of the World Cocoa 
Foundation, as a collaborative partnership between industry and development community, to 
address sustainability issues in the cocoa industry (World Cocoa Foundation, 2011). 
 
Child Labour rocks the Cocoa Industry 
In 2001 the cocoa industry was rocked as the BBC reported in a graphic documentary to 
their international audience that hundreds of thousands of children from Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Tonga had been sold into indentured servitude to cocoa farms in Cote d’Ivoire (Hawsky).  
Within the documentary sensational messages were sent from NGO’s and governmental 
organizations in West Africa to consumers, for example 8 
 
“People who are drinking cocoa...are drinking their blood. It is the blood of young 
children carrying cocoa sacks so heavy that they have wounds all over their shoulders. 
It’s really pitiful to see” (Hawsky).   
The TV audience was outraged. The BBC sent a second reporter to Cote d’Ivoire who 
confirmed that the reports were, indeed, true. These reports indicated that over 90% of farms in 
the world’s largst cocoa producing country were employing child labour (Schrage and Ewing, 
2005).  Although these reports were later provided to be exaggerated, the existence of child 
labourers and trafficking was a real issue (UNICEF, 2002). UNICEF confirmed the use of child 
slavery in Cote d’Ivoire in 2002, approximating that 200,000 children were trafficked annually 
through West and Central Africa.  These children were generally traded under a voluntary 
placement by parents for a set amount of time in exchange for a set amount of money (UNICEF, 
2002).  
Child Labour and Use in the Cocoa Industry 
  Child labour is widespread in the developing world and, in relative terms most 
widespread in Africa where labour force participation exceeds 30 percent in some areas (ILO, 
2001; UNICEF, 1997). The reported behaviour went against widely accepted international 
standards addressing child labour, forced labour and trafficking in persons (ILO, 2001; Schrage 
& Ewing, 2004). Such practices, so-called “worst forms of child labour” (UNICEF, 2002) are 
naturally concerning as related jobs can be hazardous or harmful to children’s health; more 
children are believe to die from exposure to pesticides than from all of the most common 
childhood diseases combined (Canagarajah, 2001). Additionally, child labour impedes upon 
formal education as school attendance is often limited or forgone due to agricultural work 
(UNICEF, 2002). Formal surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest that child labour has the 
highest concentration in rural sectors such as cocoa producing regions where it is often 
associated with large, rural households (Canagarajah, 2001).  
The Producing Countries Responses to the BBC Report 
As reports of child labour and trafficking gained momentum, the Ivorian government 
responded blaming industry multinationals for dictating prices unfit to sustain responsible labour 
practices  (Ivory Coast accuses chocolate companies, 2001). Governments of the producer 
countries began to recognize the economic implications of maintaining international labour laws 
and conforming to sustainable farming practices. Nigeria and Ghana began coordinating 
national programmes for the elimination of child labour and Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Guinea have taken steps to. Cote d’Ivoire ratified both the ILO Minimum Wage Convention, 
1973 (No. 138) and the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182) (International 
Programme on the Eliminataion of Child Labour (IPEC), 2001). 
Consumer Outrage, the Harkin-Engel Protocol and Public Certification 
Following these reports of the industry’s use of child labour in the production of cocoa 
outraged consumers demanded industry change and government regulation.  The industry, 
government and international organisations agreed that the use of child slavery and trafficking 
blatantly violated the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Minimum Age Convention as 
well as international laws prohibiting trafficking in persons (Schrage and Ewing, 2005). Decrees 
such as the Harkin-Engel protocol from the United States were placed on the industry that 
demanded that additional actions to be taken by the industry to police themselves.  9 
 
The Harkin- Engel Protocol called for the establishment of a joint international 
foundation to address the child labour issue and develop and implement a set of publicly certified 
standards by 2005 (Harkin-Engel Protocol, 2001).  The protocol was named after the two United 
States Senators who proposed it and is also referred to as the Cocoa Industry Protocol.  Although 
based in the United States, the protocol demanded that the international cocoa and chocolate 
industry create an objective, credible and certified sustainability effort to support the ILO 
convention 182 which prohibits child labour and requires immediate action for the elimination of 
the worst forms of child labour in the cocoa industry (The Harkin-Engel Protocol, 2001).  The 
Cocoa Verification Board was established to implement the certification components of the 
protocol with the World Cocoa Foundation providing overall coordination for these 
sustainability efforts.  
In 2003, the Ivorian Cocoa Board rejected the level of transparency that the industry 
demanded because of the “unfair advantage” that they believe it provided other producing 
countries.  In response, trade privileges granted to The Ivory Coast under the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act were revoked due to problems with corruption, lack of transparency and 
expropriation of foreign property (ILRF, 2006). The industry’s system for sustainability relied 
heavily on actions taken by producing country governments and this action raised questions as to 
the legitimacy of their structures (ILRF, 2006).  
By 2005, doubts were confirmed as the industry had failed to meet the deadline of the 
Harkin Engel Protocol. The World Cocoa Foundation (2009) sited political instability in West 
Africa and various issues for their failure to meet the Harkin Engel protocol and related 
certification requirements, including cultural practices and traditions, lack of infrastructure, 
availability of investment funds, inadequacy of schooling and vocational training systems in 
producing areas(CMA Press Release, 2005).  They also argued that the ownership structures of 
most West African cocoa farms made it difficult to determine appropriate verses inappropriate 
forms of child labour (World Cocoa Foundation, 2009).  As a result, the industry, represented by 
the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, revised their position to promise 50% certification by 
2008 (CMA, 2005).   
These shortcomings led the International Labour Rights Fund and Anti-Slavery 
International actively to campaign against the international cocoa and chocolate industry.  
Ultimately, the International Labour Rights Fund unsuccessfully sued Nestle, ADM and Cargill 
for their “involvement in the trafficking, torture and forced labour of children based upon U.S. 
statutes of Torture Victims Protection Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act” and failure to meet 
the agreed upon target mandated by the United States government (ILRF, 2006, p8; Schrage and 
Ewing, 2005). 
Over this time period, media reports continued to bring attention to “appalling 
conditions” in cocoa producing communities, often highlighting children who were without 
family or education. Although Industry representatives from the UNBISCO and CMA cited the 
on-going efforts of what was a “long-term project” for ending child slavery (Child cocoa workers 
still 'exploited', 2007), companies realized that cooperative efforts were not adequately 
responding to the unique demands presented to each brand, something else was needed. 
Ultimately the Cocoa Verification Board did not live up to the expectation of a credible, 
mutually-acceptable, voluntary, industry-wide standard of certification that the industry and 
consumer country governments had hoped (The Harkin-Engel Protocol Report, 2006); that 10 
 
cocoa beans and their derivative products have been grown and/or processed without any of the 
worst forms of child labour” and it remained heavily dependent upon producer-government 
certification. By 2008, the board and industry once again failed to achieve the revised and agreed 
upon level of 50% certification by the second deadline (International Cocoa Verification Board & 
ILRF, 2009).  
Industry Adopts Private Certification 
Since the late 1980’s private standards have become common in the food industry. 
Private standards developed for other sectors of the food industry  have slowly been adopted 
within chocolate industry by SMEs  attempting to create niche branded products around tightly 
defined consumer value propositions (Heller, 2005; Klinger & Ashworth, 2005). The first of these 
was Green and Black’s 1991 adoption of Organic Standards for their Organic Chocolate line in 
their UK health food stores (ICCO, “Organic Cocoa”, 2006).  In 1994 Green and Black’s 
adopted the Fairtrade certification to further develop their niche market offerings.   Over the 
1990’s these alternative certified private standards became an important signal of credibility and 
legitimacy of many SME product offerings in these small-scale alternative agrifood markets, such 
as farmer-owned fairtrade cooperatives and farmers markets etc (Heller, 2005).  
Immediately following reports of the use of child slave labour in the cocoa and chocolate 
industry, the Organic and Fairtrade organizations saw a massive increase in certification and 
global sales of certificed chocolate and cocoa products (Heller, 2005). Transfair (the overarching 
trade body of the fairtrade movement) responded by expanding their cocoa and chocolate 
operations in 2002 with development of the Fairtrade Cocoa Programme. Concurrently, other 
advocacy and interest groups recognised the need and began creating appropriate standards and 
participating in the private certification of cocoa and chocolate products. Equal Exchange, a 
human rights organization, announced the creation of a fairtrade chocolate in 2002 (Heller, 
2005). Rainforest Alliance, a conservation and sustainability advocacy group who had 
participated in cocoa programmes since 1997, launched its first chocolate retail product in 2004.  
At the same time, the major multinational chocolate companies understood that they too 
needed to respond, so they began creating their own private standards to certify their suppliers 
and supply chains based upon their internal best practices and quality assurance systems.  
Examples include ADM’s SERAP program (created by a processor), Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. 
Practices Program (created by a manufacturer) and Amajaro Source Trust (created by an 
international trader).  These endogenous developed certification programs often took a holistic 
approach to sustainability that included associated and partnered programmes for social, 
economic and ecological support (ADM, 2009; Starbucks, 2010; Amajaro, 2010). Each of these 
associated programs supported a series of different objectives that were dependent upon the 
efforts taken by that company (ADM, 2009; Starbucks, 2010; Amajaro, 2010).  These programs 
included activities for farmer training, education, finance, child-labour prevention, removal of 
child slaves from cocoa farms (Blowfield, 2003).  These programmes were not always used 
exclusively and in cases were developed in conjunction with other external parties to create third 
party certifications offered to the whole market (Starbucks, 2010).   
Over the 2000’s, demand for certified cocoa and chocolate products increased 
significantly with increased consumer demand for “responsibly sourced cocoa” (Barry Callebaut, 
2010). Following this rapid growth many major multinational corporations acquired, adopted 
and/or dedicated product lines and business units to development and production of niche 
certified product lines to include in there product portfolios (TCC, 2010). By 2007 nearly 100 11 
 
companies offered certified chocolate products and numerous firms showed a willingness to 
invest in certified production as they began dedicating entire brands to privately certified 
products (Fairtrade Foundation, 2011; ICCO, 2005; UTZ, 2011).  
In 2007, industry stakeholders collaborated to create an industry-led, endogenously 
developed third party certification scheme with UTZ Certified structure for cocoa and chocolate. 
The UTZ CERTIFIED Code was a set of economic, social (ILO standards) and environmental criteria for 
responsible production that had been endogenously created in 1997 for the coffee industry. UTZ Certified 
had prior track record of success in certification within many coffee industry initiatives (TCC, 
2010). UTZ certified cocoa programmes were developed in coordination with Cargill, Mars and 
Nestle. The first batch of UTZ Certified cocoa reached Europe in 2009 and the certification 
expects to grow 93 times their current production by 2020 (TCC, 2010).  UTZ Certified program 
was endogenously developed with support from major-multinational chocolate companies 
Cargill, Mars and Nestle (UTZ). Currently based in the Netherlands, UTZ has expanded its 
certification to include tea and palm oil (UTZ Certified; TCC, 2010). 
5. Analysis of Stakeholders Responses 
 
Over the past few decades there has been a repeated process of shifting from individual 
solutions to development of collective engagement and initiatives to solve each problem as it 
evolved.  This process began with the witches broom and pod borer outbreaks in the 1990’s 
where individual stakeholders after failing individually to control the outbreaks were forced to 
take part in a series of collective engagements to address these individual production problems 
that had resulted in substantial industry supply problems. Industry associations at all levels of the 
cocoa and chocolate supply chain had collaborated to provide economies of scale, representation, 
a forum for knowledge exchange and research surrounding these issues (Shapiro and Rosenquist, 
2004). At the producer level, these functions were often conducted within governmentally-
managed cocoa boards, whereas the processing and manufacturing level trade associations 
tended to segment themselves into traders, grinders and processors or processors, manufacturers 
and marketers (Shapiro and Rosenquist, 2004). Over time the industry players began to realize 
that the supply pressures on the international cocoa industry were so substantial that they 
threatened far more than the fate of just one company, but the whole industry (Schrage & Ewig, 
2005; TCC, 2010). Such susceptibility to disease and ecological and economic instability on top 
of the already fragile political environments of cocoa producers further aligned industry’s 
incentives and led to the collective development of collaborative engagements; at the Panama 
Conference and Paris Declaration, the industry embraced the that environmentally sustainable 
bio-diverse cocoa growing could stabilize ecological and even economic and social aspects 
surrounding cocoa production and supply.  Hence, the participants jointly and collectively 
committed to the production of sustainable cocoa (Shapiro and Rosenquist; Verlande and 
Tomich).  The World Bank and donor and development groups, who once ignored the cocoa 
industry as it was a “staple commodity”, began empathizing with the needs of smallholder cocoa 
farmers and the World Cocoa Foundation was created as the representative industry 
organization focused on sustainability issues (World Cocoa Foundation; Verlande & Tomich). 
Compared to many of the similar advocacy attacks of today, such as proposition 2 and caged 
hens, this type of collaboration between all of the parties is a unique and rare occurrence.  12 
 
Prior to the BBC reports and subsequent consumer outrage, certification existed within 
the chocolate industry as a niche market as a means for niche product line market differentiation 
by SMEs and these product lines were often dedicated to the objectives of the certifying body.  
The movement aimed to develop closer producer-buyer relationships with an emphasis on the 
role of the producer as a key stakeholder (Moore, 2004). Certification groups themselves were 
rapidly developing young organizations that were often segmented and disorganised with little 
market recognition in conventional markets being sold almost solely by mail order or dedicated 
retail outlets (Moore, 2004).  This lack of scale and organization within the certification 
movement meant that it initially did not have a lot of impact within the cocoa and chocolate 
industry, however the BBC reports rapidly changed that. 
The 2001 BBC reports were an important transformation event for the international 
cocoa and chocolate industry.  Although the industry players likely had limited to no knowledge 
of the abusive conditions on cocoa farms, they initially denied any involvement in child labour 
abuses. However, when challenged by consumers and advocacy groups chocolate processors and 
manufacturers admitted they were unable to certify that their product and procurement channels 
were indeed “clean” of such practices (Schrage & Ewing, 2005).  The cocoa and chocolate 
manufacturers thus faced a paradox: to conform to the advocacy demands and procure from 
channels totally “clean” of child labour while recognizing that the removal of child labour would 
drastically decrease income and profits for already poverty stricken farming households and 
communities or to do nothing and adversely damage their corporate and product brands for 
allowing child labour to remain. With their corporate reputations and fragile supply channels at 
stake with pending political action, the chocolate industry had little choice but to accept a degree 
of collective responsibility, recognizing the impact that their upstream influence could provide in 
reducing child labor as part of a successful attempt to avoid potentially devastating boycotts 
(Chocolate Firms Launch Fight Against ‘Slave Free’ Labels, 2001).   
Following the BBC reports on the use of child slavery by the cocoa and chocolate 
industry, certifications gained massive market uptake, attention and growth (TCC, 2010).  
Outraged consumers, who demanded chocolate that be produced without the use of child slave 
labour, looked for alternatives to the major chocolate manufacturers who had denied any 
connection to child abuse but were unable to guarantee their procurement channels “clean” 
(Chocolate Firms Launch Fight Against 'Slave Free' Labels, 2001).   
The initial solution was the collective development of a public certification effort 
demanded for under the Harkin-Engel Protocol.  But this effort failed as the industry continued 
to face advocacy attacks.  The companies began to understand that publicly mandated 
certification was not a viable approach to industry certification. The breadth, depth, and 
complexity of the cocoa procurement system posed a major challenge to any successful 
implementation of any certification system. Logistics was difficult in producer countries with 
underdeveloped infrastructures and political instability which further threatened supply.  Media 
reports and increasingly aggressive advocacy efforts, such as the ILRF suit placed additional 
pressure on the industry to take further action to protect their fragile reputations and unstable 
supply. After public certification efforts had failed, the industry began considering private 
individual certifications and the adoption of private third party certification systems to appease 
consumer demand for product assurance and protect against advocacy attacks.  
This presented a concurrent market opportunity for both the cocoa and chocolate firms 
and existing certification bodies operating within the industry to develop solutions to the 13 
 
problems that chocolate consumers faced.  Processors, manufacturers and traders created 
systems to certify their own internal QA systems and best practices surrounding production and 
sustainability, with or without the use of a third party auditor.  Although these certification 
systems were simple to develop and aligned with the sustainability objectives of the industry, 
private certifications did not have consumer credibility as they were questionably analogous. 
Additionally, the exclusivity in the nature of the certifications meant that the certification could 
not benefit from the pooled resources of the industry and its stakeholders and subsequently from 
the increased brand exposure.   
The industry had taken note of the success of exogenous third party certification systems 
and began to adopt them to different extents.  Niche markets such as the Fairtrade and 
organically certified cocoa and chocolate that had been taken up by small, “trendy” chocolatiers 
in North America and Europe posed an opportunity to attract new customers, follow trends and 
achieve certification to the industry.   
Many small chocolate companies based around specific certifications were acquired by 
major multinational companies. For example, Hershey’s acquired a small organic chocolate 
company after recognizing the massive growth that had been seen in the sector (Hershey’s, 2006). 
This allowed for the large chocolate manufacturer to not only profit from the financial success of 
the industry but the better understanding of the certified chocolate market as well as the goodwill 
that came from the incorporation of a well regarded organically certified chocolate brand.” 
Although this allowed Hershey’s to take advantage of a working case study to learn how to 
profitably react to emerging marketplace opportunities, the purchase of Dagoba by Hershey’s 
detracted from the value of the Dagoba brand to the same consumers who cited market appeal in 
Dagoba’s “entrepreneurial spirit”  (Heller, 2005) 
Other major multinational players dedicated specific brands to certified production. For 
example, Cadbury dedicated its KitKat line in the United Kingdom entirely to Fairtrade 
production before announcing in 2010 that their entire product line would be Fairtrade Certified. 
This allowed the large chocolate manufacturer to test the market for certification with a brand 
that attracted a market that might most likely be receptive to certification with minimal 
investment and processing alteration. This was especially suitable for Cadbury who operates in 
the United Kingdom where there is a large market for certified chocolate products (Euromonitor, 
2010).  
Within this sea of innovation was the observation that advocacy groups were venue 
shopping– these groups had a certification system (hammer) and are looking for a suitable and 
profitable problem (nail) to egage (hit).  After the BBC reports, a rapid movement of advocacy 
groups that had not previously been involved in certification of cocoa and chocolate into the 
market was observed as they attempted to take advantage of the cocoa market and their 
immediate need for certification products positioned as solutions to the problems that the 
chocolate consumers and industry were facing.  For example, Rainforest Alliance, who had been 
active in the industry to provide education on behalf of ecological interests, created a retail 
product that was often coupled with organic certification (Rainforest Alliance, 2010).  The new 
market entry of the advocacy group certifications (that had been created for political objectives 
within other markets) seemed to be more about venue shopping, where advocacy groups are 
attempting to capture new consumers and potential funding for their initiatives, than actually 
about the development and provision of workable solutions to the underlying problem for both 14 
 
the industry and cocoa producers. This is proposition is supported by the late development of the 
UTZ certification and its rapid market uptake. 
Third party certifications provide brand recognition, inclusivity, credibility, and 
partnership with interest groups that could potentially advocate against the industry while 
operating under a set of objectives separate from those of the industry, and profiting by pushing 
their own ideals. Third party certifications are inclusive and allow for participation by a variety 
of industry players which allows for them to benefit from the resources of these players and can 
tailor fit to the individual brand needs of those company’s products. They have a positive market 
reputation and high brand recognition from operating across markets and taking advantage of 
marketing opportunities in the face of advocacy attacks.  Additionally, by partnering with 
interest groups by adopting the certifications that they provide or adhere to, companies may be 
able to avoid attacks from these groups as they are seen as “supporters”.  
Adoption of third-party certifications has disadvantages for chocolate industry players as 
well. The objectives of the interest-led certification groups are inconsistent with those of the 
sustainability objectives of the industry, however, certification schemes do market themselves as 
being the solution to the sustainability issues that the industry faces. In this way, third party 
certification schemes stand to benefit from the advocacy attacks and threats that face the 
chocolate industry.  Their large market share and consumer support generates greater energy 
towards inefficient efforts of achieving the industry’s sustainability objectives.  
UTZ Certified Good Inside Certification entered the cocoa industry through an industry-
led effort to create a certification system that took advantage of the positive aspects of third party 
certification and private company-led certifications. UTZ certified was an endogenous, industry-
developed effort that was developed around the systems in processing, trade, marketing and 
production that were already in place. This made implementation less costly and led to ease of 
adoption by other chocolate companies. Additionally, the endogenous development of the 
certification allowed for the industry to create a certification that was consistent with the 
sustainability efforts of the collective industry.  
By creating a system that was not used by one individual company, although efforts were 
largely pioneered by Cargill, the industry was able to increase brand recognition and credibility 
through inclusivity. UTZ certified certification standards were assessed by and branded under a 
third party achieving credibility and consumer trust that private individual certifications lacked. 
Additionally, increased participation allows for economies of scale and the collaboration of the 
resources of many companies. The success of UTZ certified in other industries that had faced 
advocacy attacks, such as the coffee industry, as well as its inclusive nature allowed for higher 
brand buy-in and thus brand recognition by the consumer. Ultimately the industry stands to gain 
from this direct support of a program that is consistent with their sustainability objectives as a 
whole rather than those of an exogenous interest group.  
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Figure One: The Global Cocoa-Chocolate Value Chain 
 
Source: Adapted from Roberts, 2002 
Figure Two: World Cocoa Production 
 
 
Source: Roberts, 2002 
   
Small Holders  Local Links  Local Trader  Exporter  International 
Trader  Processor  Branded Goods 
Manufacturer  Retailer 
Percentage of World Cocoa Production 
West Africa 
South/Central America 
Asia and Oceania 
Other 16 
 
Figure Three: Global Chocolate Industry Market Share 
 
 
Source: Oxfam International, 2008 
 
   









Table One: Major Third-Party Certification Schemes in the Cocoa and 
Chocolate Industry  
 




Established in Cocoa 
Industry*: 2004 
2010 production: 79,200 
2020 est. production: 
500,000 
Works to conserve biodiversity and ensure sustainable livelihoods by transforming 
land-use practices, business practices and consumer behaviours. Certification 
guarantees limited water pollution and use, limited soil erosion, limited threats to 
the environment and human health, wildlife habitat protection, limited waste, more 
efficient farm management, standards of working conditions and availability of 
collaboration for farmers with conservationists as compared to traditional 
agriculture. Rainforest Alliance farms are certified by the Sustainable Agriculture 
Network (SAN) who’s standards cover ecosystem conservation, worker rights and 
safety, wildlife protection, water and soil conservation, agrochemical reduction, 
housing and wage standards. 
Strong on environmental quality issues and strong in trading conditions, market 
transparency and social quality with no coverage of health and food safety. 
Regarded by the industry as having solid internal management, flexible and tolerant 
standards but with a relatively weak accreditation structure, inner management 




Established in Cocoa 
Industry*:2007 
2010 production: 20,000 
2020 est. production: 
500,000 
UTZ Certified is an industry-producer partnership with an independent board of 
stakeholders that sets and certifies the abidance by a set of economic, social and 
environmental criterion for responsible production. The UTZ Certified cocoa 
programme the endogenous development of a third-party certification programme 
on behalf of the cocoa industry.  The crucial element of the certification is a web-
based “Track and Trace” system that is monitored by a “chain of custody” to ensure 
certified product.  
Standards are tolerant of low entry level producer groups and there are strong 
internal and external auditing systems and superior traceability however UTZ 
supplies limited guidance to producers a weakness is that continuous improvement 
is not required. Quality is a major theme and UTZ contains criterion for health and 




Established in Cocoa 
Industry*:1994 
2010 production: 80,000 
2020 est. production: 
475,000 
Fairtrade certification aims to be independent, transparent and globally consistent 
and is controlled by the Fairtrade labelling organization (FLO) which is a group of 
24 organizations. FLO certifies practices consistent with the requirements of ISO 65, 
an international standard for transparency, independence and management in 
agricultural practices using a private secondary company, FLO-CERT.  A key 
component of Fairtrade certification is the presence of a minimum price for 
producers which are regulated separately from the market as well as a fairtrade price 
premium.  
FLO Standards require continuous improvement, are tolerant of low entry level 
producer groups and give much attention to planning. Weaker points include the 
accreditation structure and chain coverage with almost no requirements on action 
on audit findings and little attention to product quality, health and food safety. 
Fairtrade labelling pays a great deal of attention to social quality with moderate 




Established in Cocoa 
Industry*:1991 
2010 production: 20,000 
2020 est. production: 
80,000 
Organic certification is strong in risk-based internal and external auditing, third 
party certification, chain coverage and traceability. The standards are zero-tolerance 
and thus weak in inclusiveness and in continual improvement. They are strong on 
environmental standards but have no coverage on health and food safety as well as 
social coverage and are difficult to interpret.  
Source: Tropical Commodity Coalition, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO),  
*year that certified product first entered the market 
Unit of production=-tonnes 
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